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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
KRAIG JAMES CANFIELD, 
Defendant-Appellant, 
Case No. 960085-CA 
Priority No. 2 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant-appellant, Kraig James Canfield, appeals a trial court 
order denying his motion to withdraw a guilty plea to one count of forcible 
sodomy, a first degree felony under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-403(2)&(3), The 
appealed-from order was entered by the Sixth Judicial District Court in 
Sevier County, Utah, Honorable David L. Mower, Judge, presiding. This 
Court has jurisdiction by transfere from the Utah Supreme Court, pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4)(Supp. 1995). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPEALLATE REVIEW 
This case presents two issues for review. 
1. Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea on the ground that the motion was untimely ? 
This question involves contested facts pertaining to procedures for the 
submission of a request to withdraw a guilty plea which may be jurisdict-
ional and can be reviewed De Novo for correctness by this court. See State 
v. Price, 837 P.2d 578, 581-84 (Utah App. 1992)(treating timeliness of plea 
withdrawal motion as jurisdictional question of law). 
2. Did the trial court properly deny defendantfs motion on the 
express alternative ground that defendant did not show good cause ? 
A trial court!s denial of a timely plea withdrawal motion is deferentially 
reviewed on appeal for "abuse of discretion." State v Gardner, 844 P.2d 
293, 295 (Utah 1992);State v Thorup, 841 P.2d 746 (Utah App. 1992), cert, 
denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES and RULES 
United States Constitution, Amendments V, VI and XIV. Utah State 
Constitution, Articles I, Sections VII, IX, X, XI, XII, XIII, XIV and XXIV. 
Article V, Section I. Utah Code Ann., Sections 76-1-105, 76-1-501, 76-2-101, 
76-2-102, 76-5-403, 76-5-403.1, 76-5-406. Utah Criminal Code, Section 77-13-
6 and Utah Judicial Code, Section 78-2-2(4). Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
5 and 6. Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 2, 3, 11 and 30. Utah Rules of 
Evidence 103, 401, 402 and 403. 
Defendant expressly denies each and every allegation of Appellee 
not expressly admitted herein. This is a Reply Brief submitted pursuant 
to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(c) and is to be incorporated with 
Appellant Brief in the instant case. 
- 2 -
ARGUMENT 
1. TIMELYNESS OF REQUEST 
'_... .,..-. . .i_ caju, the question at this point is whether Defendant was 
reasonably informed by the court as required by Utah Rule of Criminal Proced-
ure 11(f) that states in relevant i.sr' f 
(f) Fail ure to advise the defendant c: m e time limits for filing 
any motion to withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and 
mentally ill is not a ground for setting the plea aside, but may be 
the ground for extending the ti me to make a mo"Mnr> i inder Secti on 
77-13-6. 
On 04 Octet-- : 1'n*'. ^ i ial <<;;:> issued the following order (R.116-17} lu 
Defendant that states in rel< \ . ' 
"' , likely j •. i -.ee each other again. Thei e!s 
a couple of things you need to know about, before you leave. Youfve 
pled guilty today. You've got 30 days from today to change your 
mind about pleading guilty, but you can only change your mind if 
you ask me in writing and if I give you permission to change your 
mind. ITm not saying whether I would or wouldn't give you permis-
sion, but my point is to tell you that there's a deadline for ask-
ing and it's 30 days from today. So if vou don't ask then, you'll 
never get a chance to even talk about; it ." 
Appellee has relied upon State v Price, 837 P.2d 578 (Utah App. 1992) as 
to the jurisdictjonal nature of Section 77-13~-6(b) under the exception jn 
Rule I K O nllowirig the 30 d n deadline t • .\t. :..!,• •..( ,.nri:i..t i,-,, 
betMi j)](tj'cr<) • niormea -.•! L:IU requirements oi the rule due to omission ol ati 
essential requirement from t lie rule nv icrord. See also State v Maguire, 830 
P.2d >l^ '»'* ^ •' ' M;r Court Ordnr dots ^ ' •• • ' 
must uu liieu wiLii m e cnur: -^.-i k am! IJLIOJO the '„) days expire. Defendant 
Defendant was refered to as Mr. Doe in these proceedings. 
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was merely informed that he had 30 days to ask permission to change his mind 
about pleading guilty and to do that in writing. Such notice was ambiguous 
2 
and does not substantially conform to language of Section 77-13-6 * or the 
requirements of Rule 11. Defendant has not challenged the jurisdictional 
nature of Section 77-13-6 but rather the procedure for compliance under the 
restricted conditions imposed upon him. The lack of reasonable notice of 
what and how to act pursuant to the correct rules has further served to im-
pare his right to act within the context of the law or order of the court. 
Accordingly, the case at bar qualifies for the exception under Rule 11(f) 
for extention of time. Defendant only refered to tlie ff prison mailbox rule " 
as an analogous case because that court addressed appropriate procedure for 
the filing of a motion for discretionary post conviction relief subjected to 
prison mail procedure and relevant court rules rather than the strict Rule 
of appellate procedure for Notices of Appeal even though both are jurisdict-
ional in nature. Defendant did not receive fair or reasonable notice of how 
to act to preserve his right to proceed and complied substantially with the 
order of the court within the relevant time period. 
Finally, Defendantfs request should be considered timely because trial 
court overreached the impediment and ruled on the merits of the question by 
stating an expressed alternitive ground of not based upon good cause shown 
and thus de facto considered is as timely. See State v Parker, 235 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 36, citing State v Belgard, 830 P.2d 264, 266 (Utah 1992)(per curiam). 
After several months, Defendant enquired about his request and was given a 
Briefing Order (R.51-52) whereby he submitted a memorandum (R.72-86) in the 
~2 
U.C.A. § 77-13-6(2)(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no con-
test is made by motion and shall be made within 30 days after entry of the 
plea. 
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support of his request. The Court accepted the memorandum and the appellee 
responded. Counsel for defendant withdrew (R.49-50) and court ordered plea 
hearing transcript.(R.43-44) It was apparent that court had acted in review 
of the merits of defendantTs cause treating his request as timely. 
2. GOOD CAUSE WAS DEMONSTRATED 
There is a presumption against a post-sentencing motion to withdraw pleas 
of guilty. Court will grant such a request only to correct a manifest injust-
ice. See United States v Teller, 762 F.2d 569, 574 (7th Cir. 1985). Defendant 
asserted that there was no legal or factual basis for the valid establishment 
of guilt contending that the omission, " waiver f!, of an essential element of 
over fourteen altered the charging terms under U.C.A. § 76-5-403, Such waiver 
would have the effect of creating a distinctly new and different crime which 
was not intended by the legislature and could not be sentenced under U.C.A. 
§ 76-5-406(9) or (11) as a first degree felony. Additionally, had the waiver 
been made envolving substance of the nature of crime then it also stands as 
waived for purposes of sentencing under § 76-5-403(2)&(3) regarding to young 
to consent. Otherwise enforcement of a conviction would only distort the 
mens legis as well as mens rea of the statute as the legislature intended. 
Defendant has not seen a copy of the minute entry commemorating the only 
preliminary hearing held outlining the State's evidence against him. (R.21) 
He pled not guilty at those proceedings and maintained his innocence through-
out under the original charges. No gun was found even though the police did 
look for one and E.Q. had testified that Defendant said he would not hurt him 
at that hearing. Evedence taken from E.Q. was inconclusive and not directly 
connected to the defendant by D.N.A. compairson or otherwise. (Br. of the 
appellee at 3)(..., bodily fluid samples were taken from Canfield, although 
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the record does not reveal the result of any fluid comparison testing.) and 
Defendantfs account of the incident is remarkably different from that of E. 
Q.. He is still denying that he ever sought E.Q. to victimize or threaten 
him. Police stated that they found defendant asleep in the back yard. He 
has no recollection of them arriving or handcuffing him nor could he assist 
his court appointed counsel with details sufficient enough to aid in his 
defense. E.Q. testified however, that defendant said he would not hurt him. 
In State v Jackson, 721 P.2d 232 (Kan. 1986) the court found in very 
similar circumstances that;" A conviction based upon an information which does 
not sufficiently charge the offense for which the accused is convicted is void. 
Failure of an information to sufficiently state an offense is a fundamental 
defect which can be raised at any time, even on appeal." Id. at 235. Such an 
omission, " waiver tT, of an essential element necessary for both jurisdiction 
and substance is an alteration of the charging terms that fails to charge an 
offense as the legislature intended. This has also deprived Defendant of his 
right to be enabled to plead a conviction thereunder in bar of another prosec-
ution for the same offense violating his protection against double jeopardy 
guaranteed by the constitutions of Utah and the United States. Constructive 
amendments are prejudicial per se and its not likely Defendant would have or 
could have been found guilty under the original charges. That would require 
a jury to supply, by intendment, material fact (bodily fluid taken from E.Q. 
belonged to defendant) not held in evidence. See People v Hill, 3 Utah 334, 
3 P. 75 (1884). The information charges no crime as a first degree felony 
in its present form. Defendant was apprised of the substance of § 76-5-403 
as a class B misdemeanor (R.108) when court instructed him of what the State 
would be required to prove in order for a jury to find him guilty of forcible 
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sodomy. No correction was entered and Defendant believing what the court 
said was availed to rely on that information in wieghing the benefits and 
risks of going to trial or entering a plea. 
In Utah a court has no right, when language employed by legislature in 
statute is unambiguous, to make, by construction, exceptions or qualificat-
ions to meet hardship of particular case; for court to do so would be usurp-
ation of legislative power. See Smith v Schwartz, 21 U. 126, 60 P.305, 81 Am. 
St. Rep. 670. But see also, Columbia Natural Resources, Inc. v Tatum, 58 
F.3d 1101 (6th Cir. 1995)(quoting United States v Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Weat) 
76, 95, 5 L.Ed. 37 (1820)(Marshall,C.J.)("[i]t is the legislature, not the 
court, which is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment11). Id. at 1105. 
No omission or rf waiver fr could have been made of the over fourteen element 
contained in § 76-5-403 in order to avoid sentencing defendant under a manda-
tory sentence. A five-to-life is available under both the original charges 
and § 76-5-403 and was no benefit to defendant. A waiver of that element is 
a waiver in the entirety which reduces the charge to a class B misdemeanor as 
apprised by the court. (R.108). A conviction under § 76-5-403 as a first 
degree felony must be considered void and a manifest injustice that has depr-
ived defendant of his constitutional rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause. 
See United States v Cannon, 116 U.S. 55, 6 S.Ct. 278, 29 L.Ed 561 (1885) and 
Russell v United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763-64, 8 L.Ed.2d 240, 82 S.Ct. 1038 
[1046-47] (1962). 
This aspect was presented in defendantTs memorandum and is examined in 
Menna v New York, wherein " We do not hold that a double jeopardy claim may 
never be waived. We simply hold that a plea of guilty to a charge does not 
waive a claim that—judged on its face—the charge is one which the State 
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may not constitutionally prosecute." Federal law requires that a conviction 
on that charge be set aside even if the conviction was entered pursuant to a 
counseled plea of guilty. Id. at 62. See also U.S. v Kaiser, 893 F.2d 1300, 
1303 (11th Cir. 1990)(applying the Menna/Blackledge, exception). (R.78) In 
Utah a Defendant does not have a right to plead guilty but does have a right 
to be enabled to bar another prosecution for the same offense with a guilty 
plea thereunder. The waiver has created a non-crime as a first degree felon} 
which the State cannot constitutionally prosecute and as such the appropriate 
remedy is to reduce the conviction under that statute to the lesser included 
crime that is not jeopardy-barred. See Morris v Mathews, 475 U.S. 237, 244-
48 (1986). The State should not be allowed to continue to reprosecute the 
Defendant over and over until they obtain some sort of conviction that suits 
them. The Constitutions of Utah and the United States prohibit that. See, 
United States v Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 87, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 2192, 57 L.Ed.2d 65 
(1978)(quoting, Green v United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88, 78 S.Ct. 221, 
223, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957)). 
Because the 5-to-life sentence imposed on defendant was available under 
any of the original charges for a conviction, any waiver of the essential 
over fourteen element was an absurdity of no benefit to defendant and only 
operates to violate his substantial rights to his prejudice by depriving 
him of a grand jury, to be honestly informed of the crime for which he pled 
guilty and was sentenced for, and the right to plead a conviction in bar of 
another prosecution for that offense. See United States v Kelly, 722 F.2d 
837, 876 (1st Cir. 1983), cert, denied, 465 U.S. 1070, 104 S.Ct. 1425, 79 
L.Ed.2d 749 (1984). Constructive amendments of charging terms cannot be a 
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choice among alternative courses of action open to defendant and counsel's 
advice fails to fall within the range of competence demanded of attorneyTs 
in criminal cases, (Teller, supra at 5) But see also (Menna supra at 62 
citing, Blackledge). Counsel also failed to apprise Defendant of probabi-
lity of" an acquittal or mis trial had he gone to trial. Juries cannot be 
expected to supply material facts not held in evidence. Utah Code Annotated 
§ 76-1-501 requires that the State prove all elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt and Utah Code Annotated § 76-2-101 requires that that conduct be within 
the definition of the offence as the definition of the offense requires. A 
counsel appointed by the court still has a duty to assist a defendant with a 
proper defense including correct legal advise and protection of his substant-
ial rights under the XIV Amend, of the U.S. Constitution. Counsel failed Mr. 
Canfield drastically and did not appeal or assist with the request to with-
draw an invalid plea of guilty. This underminds the confidence in the out-
come of the present proceedings which does not represent a mere factual in-
congruency. Certainly, had the case gone to trial, there was a probability 
that a more favorable outcome would have resulted in defendantfs behalf. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Appellate Court should Reverse the trial 
court's conviction of defendant as a first degree felony and Remand this 
case for resentencing defendant under U.C.A., § 76-5-403 as a class B mis-
demeanor. In the alternative, all charges should be dismissed with prejudice 
vacating the commitment and releasing defendant forthwith from custody of the 
Department of Corrections. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 
Mill day of AJhil , 1996. 
faritl Owl* 
Kraig James Canfiel 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Kraig James Canfield, hereby certify that I have 
mailed, first class postage prepaid, two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Motion for Variance and Appellant's 
Reply Brief to J.Kevin Murphy, Assistant Attorney General, at 
the following address: 
J.Kevin Murphy 
Assistant Attorney General 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
on the 25th day of OJ^M4 , 1996 
Kraig^James Canfield 
cc: R. Don Brown 
Sevier County Attorney 
250 North Main Street 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
APPENDIX I 
LETTER 
Note of officer J.R. Wheeler, Star 2 facility 
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Kraig James Canfield 
P.O. Box 250 USP 23287 Star 2,D-8-B Draper, Utah 84020 
To: Clerk 
Utah Court Of Appeals 
230 South 500 East, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Re: State v Canfield, Case No. 960085-CA 
Date: aMsvii ifn,im> 
Dear Clerk, 
Please find enclosed original and seven copies 
of Motion for Variance and Reply Breif of Appellant for filing 
in the above-captioned case. I am indigent and proceeding pro 
se. Therefore, I've found it necessary to request a variance 
from proceedure in filing regarding the binding and cover of 
my Appellant brief. We do not have such means available to us 
here at the prison. 
Please file my Reply Breif and notify me of any 
further action in my case. 
Thank you, 
fytUl faflfid/ 
ames Canfield, Appellant 
Utah State Prison, 23287 
P.O. Box 250 Stat 2, D-8-B 
Draper, Utah 84020 
cc: Utah Attorney General 
J.Kevin Murphy 
Seveir County Attorney 
R. Don Brown 
KRAIG JAMES CANFIELD 
UTAH STATE PRISON 
P.O. BOX 250 
DRAPER, UTAH 84020 
Appearing pro se 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v . 
KRAIG JAMES CANFIELD, 
Defendant-Appellant 
Motion for Variance 
Rule 27(d) U.R.APP.P, 
Case No. 960085-CA 
Priority No. 2 
COMES NOW, Kraig James Canfield, Defendant and 
Appellant, and moves this court pursuant to Rule 27(d) Utah 
Rules Of Appellate Procedure and requests a variance from 
Rule 27. Form of briefs., in filing of Appellant Reply Brief 
Good Cause 
Defendant-Appellant is proceeding indigent and 
pro se with this appeal. He does not have the means to bind 
or cover his brief as required by Rule 27 and respectfully 
requests the court grant him an exception. 
Submitted th is ^^fflday of <2<d*uX , 1996. 
Kraig James Canfield 
Defendant-Appellant 
KRAIG JAMES CANFIELD 
P.O. Box 250 USP 23287 Star 2, D-8-B Draper, Utah 84020 
To: Utah Court of Appeals 
230 South 500 East, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Re: State v Canfield, Case No. 960085-CA 
Date April 3, 1996 
Dear Clerk, 
I am the Defendant-appellant in the above-captioned case 
and Ifm writing to request an extention of time to file my Reply Brief in 
response to the important questions presented in the Brief of Appellee. I 
am indigent and will need a few days extra to obtain the required copies 
necessary pursuant to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Additionally, Ifm attempting to search for the controlling 
case law pertaining to " waiver " or stipulation to omit any essential 
elements of a crime charged. I cannot find anything as of this date other 
than State v Holt, 104 Wash. 2d 315, 320, 704 P.2d 1189 (1985). wherein 
the court held: 
n[t]he omission of any statutory element of a crime in 
the charging document is a constitutional defect which 
may result in dismissal of the criminal charges." 
Consequently, I may find it necessary to submit a request 
for supplimental authority from another State that may be analogous to a 
Utah opinion. 
Please file my request for extention of time to submit a 
Reply Brief and notify me if it is granted. 
Thank you, 
Kraig Canfield, Appellant 
cc: Utah Attorney General 
Sevier County Attorney 
